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9 Nov 53

TO: Chief, SR/3  
FROM: SR/3-W2  
SUBJECT: Report of meetings with CASSOWARY 2 and 15

1. On 29 and 30 October, 1953 two operational meetings were held in Washington at which were present CASSOWARY 2, CASSOWARY 15, [ ] and [ ], the latter making only a brief appearance on the second day of the meetings for the purpose of discussing PP problems with CASSOWARY 2. Topics discussed at these meetings were as follows:

- a. Agent recruitment
- b. Developments in Project AERANTER (black radio broadcasts)
- c. Reception and handling of expected CAWNPORE couriers
- d. CARTHAGES 10, 15 and 16
- e. CAVATINA 1's proposed message to Miron
- f. Financial support of several former PA'S who are to serve as listening posts in their employment in various ZUDAK offices in Europe
- g. W/T traffic coordination
- h. General PP discussions
- i. Other

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2. Re para 1a.

a. Since the problem of recruitment was not brought to some conclusion at the last meeting with CASSOWARY 2, it was the first item of the agenda to be considered. CASSOWARY 2, naturally, again requested the formation of a cadre as a pool for agent recruitment. To counter this request, since it was already decided that its formation is impossible at this time, the case officers stressed the need from CAWNPORE its request of personnel requirements, i.e., w/t operators, printers, political activists, etc., before a cadre formation could be considered. To this, CASSOWARY 2 replied that the homeland had already given him a mandate or authority to handle all agent recruitment, training, dispatch, etc. Admitting this, the case officers, nevertheless, reverted to their original arguments that without knowing what type personnel the homeland required it would be impossible to get approval for a cadre even though CASSOWARY 2 had been authorized by the homeland to recruit and train agent personnel.

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b. Having concluded to everybody's satisfaction that the cadre idea must wait for further developments, the case officers expressed the need for several agent recruits to be prepared for 1954 dispatch. CASSOWARY 2 was asked, without further ado, what could he do in this respect. He thus stated that he knows two very good prospects, former UPA members, both in Canada, who have intimated their desire to do something for their homeland. CASSOWARY 2 recommended that these two be recruited. He was told, unfortunately, that it is not permissible to recruit in Canada and that recruitment had to be done either in Europe or in the United States.

c. Accepting his limitations in the field of recruitment, CASSOWARY 2 agree to try to recruit in the United States, using CASSOWARY 4 to contact prospective candidates. As a matter of fact, whether anticipating this conclusion or not, CASSOWARY 2 had, a day prior to the meeting, dispatched CASSOWARY 4 to Philadelphia to contact and assess several people who might be approached for recruitment. It was further agreed, since CASSOWARY 4 would travel quite extensively within the United States in his search for recruits, that he would be reimbursed for all travel fares. ? e

d. In concluding the discussions on recruitment, CASSOWARY 2 said that in the near future he would write to KOVAL to plan to exfiltrate in 1954 as many as twenty young, intelligent, legalized Ukrainians for training and dispatch.

3. Para 1b.

a. Although not on the case officers' agenda for discussion at this time, CASSOWARY 2 requested a progress report on the project AERANTER. Even before hearing this report, both CASSOWARY 2 and 15 expressed their pessimistic views regarding this project as a result of no concrete or positive results to-date. However, both case officers, as well as M. Natirbov in his discussion with CASSOWARY 2, assured CASSOWARY 2 that much progress had been made in establishing facilities for broadcasting to the Ukraine via a black radio base, but that several technical difficulties had to be overcome before operations could be begun. A tentative date of approximately two months was set as a goal for initiating the first broadcast. CASSOWARY 2 had no more to say on the subject.

4. Para 1c.

a. A lengthy discussion was had on how to handle the CAWNPORE couriers if and when they arrive either in Berlin or Vienna. The case officers first explained to CASSOWARY 2 how they thought the couriers should be handled. The steps as outlined are as follows:

i. ☐ would be notified either by Berlin or Vienna, depending on the route of exfiltration, of the couriers' arrival.

ii. ☐ would then notify CASSOWARY 6 and together with him go to receive them.

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iii. In the meantime, an American case officer who would serve as escort for the two couriers in bringing them to the United States, would, either with CASSOWARY 4 or 15, depart from Headquarters for Frankfurt or Munich.

iv. After receiving the couriers, [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 would escort them via air to a pre-arranged safehouse in either Frankfurt or Munich to await transport to the United States.

v. Sometime during their delay enroute to the United States, CASSOWARY 3 would visit the couriers to welcome them officially and to question them on matters of interest to him.

vi. Once in the States, the couriers would be taken and kept at a safehouse located somewhere in the Washington vicinity. A minimum of American and CASSOWARY personnel would be permitted to visit this safehouse. This would include, CASSOWARIES 2, 4, 15, David Murphy, [ ] [ ] , a DOB representative (who would remain at the safehouse twenty-four hours a day), a housekeeping couple, and possibly a carriage operator. ?

b. Basically, CASSOWARY 2 agreed to the above plan but suggested that perhaps CASSOWARY 6 could serve as CASSOWARY escort, with the American case officer, thus eliminating the need for sending either CASSOWARY 4 or 15 to represent the CASSOWARIES. He also mentioned that in using CASSOWARY 6 as an escort it would enable CASSOWARY 6 to make that long-awaited-for visit to the United States.

c. In handling the couriers, CASSOWARY 2 stressed the importance of keeping visitors to the couriers to a minimum, pointing out what he considered bad handling of CARTHAGE 3 and a desire of not having the same repeated with these couriers. As regards the pouch itself, he requested that it be turned over to him intact. After he checked it, he would make its entire contents available to us.

d. It was agreed that the field would be notified as to the above plan of handling the couriers and at the same time, CASSOWARY 2 would include with our pouch to [ ] a letter to CASSOWARY 3 instructing him of the plan. This instruction, yet to be written, will be delivered to us via CASSOWARY 15.

e. Note: The details of the above plan were not discussed at the meetings since there were still several problems to be worked out. At the meeting, too, CASSOWARY 2 wrongly assumed that the couriers could be flown to the United States almost immediately after arriving in Germany, not realizing, of course, that some delay is inevitable in carrying out such a plan. Since this meeting, the case officers have begun the detailed planning, the results of which will be forwarded to [ ] [ ] . Basic changes to the general plan outlined above are: CASSOWARY 4 will serve as escort rather than CASSOWARY 6; the couriers will be kept in a safehouse in Munich pending their departure for the United States.

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4. Re para 1d.

a. On several occasions during the meetings the case officers probed CASSOWARY 2 for more details of the events leading to the rejection of CARTHAGES 10, 15 and 16 for a mission to the Ukraine. It might be said here that CASSOWARY 2, both during these and recent meetings with him, was reluctant to relate the entire episode regarding the CARTHAGE team and only after what bordered on a cross examination did he part with some information. What information was obtained follows.

b. Shortly after CASSOWARY 2 had arrived in Munich he discussed the morale, etc, of the CARTHAGE team with CASSOWARIES 3 and 6, and was told by them that the team lacked what they termed proper ideological motivation and that CARTHAGE 10, having recently become interested in world politics, had begun to express himself regarding the futility of the Ukrainian struggle in light of the peace talks and other top level world developments, and was instrumental in influencing CARTHAGE 15 and 16 in their attitude regarding the forthcoming mission. Armed with this information, CASSOWARY 2 visited the team at their safehouse.

c. Since CARTHAGE 10 was the key to the problem, CASSOWARY 2 concentrated his attention on him. During the course of their discussions, CASSOWARY 2 learned from CARTHAGE 10 directly those same pessimistic views regarding the future of Ukrainian resistance in the homeland as CASSOWARY 2 had learned earlier from CASSOWARY 3 and 6.

d. Assuming that it was out of the question to send the team to the homeland, CASSOWARY 2 decided to conduct a "personal CE operation" so to speak, to determine whether there were any security problems involved regarding the team (and probably, although he did not say as much, to justify for the benefit of the Americans and the Homeland his rejection of the team for the mission.) Therefore, CASSOWARY 2 probed CARTHAGE 10 on any contacts he might have had with other Ukrainians during his training period. After CARTHAGE 10 persistently denied having any contacts whatsoever, CASSOWARY 2 asked CARTHAGE 10 whether he had been meeting with CARTHAGE 3. At first CARTHAGE 10 denied seeing CARTHAGE 3 but when CASSOWARY 2 led CARTHAGE 10 to believe he had talked to CARTHAGE 3 who could have told him of his relationship with CARTHAGE 10, CARTHAGE 10 admitted that during the late summer of 1953 he had seen CARTHAGE 3 occasionally. These meetings came about, said CARTHAGE 10, after he had accidentally met CARTHAGE 3 at the beach on Lake Starnberg. After this original meeting CARTHAGES 3 and 10 would meet occasionally in Munich.

e. Once having learned that CARTHAGE 10 had been seeing CARTHAGE 3, CASSOWARY 2 assumed that CARTHAGE 3 had undoubtedly filled CARTHAGE 10 with many of the ideas he was now expounding well as influenced him in his attitude regarding the CASSOWARIES, some of whom CARTHAGE 3 had come to dislike violently. CARTHAGE 10 shed some light on what he had discussed with CARTHAGE 3, but was reluctant to tell all. Thus, to round out the picture, CASSOWARY 2 devised a plan in which to CARTHAGE 10 it appeared as though CASSOWARY 2 wanted his help in obtaining derogatory information on CARTHAGE 3. The plan was the following. CARTHAGE 10 was to arrange a meeting with CARTHAGE 3 during which time he would tell

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CARTHAGE 3 that he, CARTHAGE 10, was departing for the Ukraine in three days. CARTHAGE 10 was then to ask CARTHAGE 3 whether he had any message he wanted to deliver to the Homeland. (In light of this action on the part of CASSOWARY 2, it can be assumed that he had already decided not to use the present CARTHAGE team for the mission.)

f. The plan worked as expected by CASSOWARY 2. CARTHAGE 3, when learning that CARTHAGE 10 was to contact KOVAL, requested that CARTHAGE 10 pass on to KOVAL his, CARTHAGE 3's uncomplimentary opinions regarding the ZPUHVR, the intelligence gathering aspect of the mission as the primary goal rather than the struggle for the Ukrainian cause, and his adverse opinions of the CASSOWARY members and especially CASSOWARY 4. CARTHAGE 3 even wrote a brief memo to be transmitted to KOVAL.

g. After learning from CARTHAGE 10 of his above described meeting with CARTHAGE 3, CASSOWARY 2 visited CARTHAGE 3. Since CARTHAGE 10 played his part in strict confidence, CARTHAGE 3 was unaware of CASSOWARY 2's role in the scheme of things. CASSOWARY 2 asked CARTHAGE 3 whether he had been seeing CARTHAGE 10. As expected, CARTHAGE 3 answered in the negative. Then when CASSOWARY 2 let CARTHAGE 3 believe he had discussed the meetings in question and got an admission from CARTHAGE 10, including the last meeting held, CARTHAGE 3 confessed seeing CARTHAGE 10. However, CARTHAGE 3 did not tell CASSOWARY 2 of the memo he wrote to KOVAL. CASSOWARY 2 did not question him on it.

h. CASSOWARY 2 had nothing further to say regarding the rejection of the team for the mission as he felt the above explanation, including the results of his contrived scheme, afforded ample material as proof of the unworthiness of the team from the Ukrainian side of the operation. CASSOWARY 2 did add, however, that the team could possibly be used as some later date for a mass-type operation as might be mounted under different internal conditions, i.e., war with the Soviet Union. In the meantime, though, the team members should definitely be shelved.

#### 5. Re Para 1e.

a. CASSOWARY 2 informed the case officers that he had received from REBET CAVATINA 1's proposed text to MIRON which CAVATINA 1 allegedly requested that JAYHAWK transmit. The message contained twelve specific points, the most important of which, of course, was instruction to MIRON to subordinate himself to KOVAL. CASSOWARY 2 did not elaborate on the other contents of the message since he did not have a copy of the message with him at the meetings, nor did he remember points other than the one mentioned.

b. CASSOWARY 2 asked the case officers to request of JAYHAWK its copy of the message as given them by CAVATINA 1. He felt, in making this request, that although he concurred in the message, he wanted to make certain that JAYHAWK received precisely the same message he received. In other words, before concurring officially with the message and before agreeing to having it transmitted, obviously not trusting either JAYHAWK or CAVATINA 1, CASSOWARY 2 wanted to see JAYHAWK's copy before letting them know he had received a copy too and that he agreed with its contents.

c. CASSOWARY 2 was requested to furnish us with a copy of this message. This he promised to do.

6. Re Para 1f.

a. CASSOWARY 2 brought up the problem of using four PA's who at present are either affiliated with ZUDAK or have assurance that they can be, to serve as informants for both the ZP and the Americans, reporting on subjects of interest to both. To use these PA's however, or at least to expect their maximum efforts in our behalf, CASSOWARY 2 suggested that we supplement their ZUDAK salaries with a nominal stipend. At present, pointed out CASSOWARY 2, one PA is with the ZUDAK office in Berlin, one is in Trieste while the other two are tentatively scheduled for Vienna and Turkey respectively.

b. The case officers agreed with CASSOWARY 2 that these PA's should be used to our advantage. Further, the case officers told CASSOWARY 2 that an allotment had already been made for these PA's and the field advised accordingly. The case officers impressed upon CASSOWARY 2 that although the "take" from these PA's would normally be received by the CASSOWARIES first, that we expected to share equally in the product. CASSOWARY 2 agreed to this arrangement.

7. Re Para 1g.

a. Taking up the unfinished matter of coordinating W/T messages when W/T traffic is transferred to Headquarters, CASSOWARY 2 authorized CASSOWARY 15 to act in his behalf as coordinator of messages of minor import. He also agreed, that in the event more important messages were to be sent to the field, requiring the established authenticator for CASSOWARY 5's benefit, he himself would sign-off and authenticate these messages.

b. CASSOWARY 2 wrote to CASSOWARY 3 (in the letter containing instructions to CASSOWARY 3 on the handling of the expected couriers) requesting the system of deriving the message authenticators.

8. Re Para 1h.

a. Although CASSOWARY 2 spent some time during the two day meetings discussing innumerable political topics, sometimes in the form of a monologue with no other purpose in mind than to express his opinion on this or that item of interest without expecting action to be forthcoming, it was not until Milia Natirbov arrived on the scene during the latter part of the meetings that CASSOWARY 2 concentrated on subjects of immediate interest to him and his organization.

b. CASSOWARY 2's introduction to the political discussions was to bring to the attention of the case officers present the urgent need of the United States to take advantage in the cold war of the comparative weakness in the internal USSR, as shown by Soviet press reports of concessions being made to the people, reminiscent of the NEP period, and of accounts of Party speeches to the young people of the Soviet Union who have supposedly come under the influence of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalists. Other than listen to what CASSOWARY 2 had to say in this respect, there was little the case officers could do other than agree that all possible should be done by the US to take advantage of the described

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situation.

c. This topic was followed by CASSOWARY 2's suggestion that the U.S. request the Ukrainian emigre organization to unite for a common front and platform in the struggle against communism and the overthrow of the existing regime in the Soviet Union. CASSOWARY 2 felt certain that at the suggestion of some agency of the U.S. Government, the heretofore disunited Ukrainian groups would amiably consent to join forces in the realization of their aims. This, continued CASSOWARY 2, would have the same influence among the Ukrainians as the AMCOMLIB originally had in attempting to unite other emigre groups. Under CASSOWARY 2's proposal, the major Ukrainian groups would automatically go along with the unification, with lesser groups following in due time. Once unified, a representative would be selected to deal with the U.S. Government. A select group would maintain contact with CAWNPORE (here CASSOWARY 2 meant continuation of contact with CAWNPORE via present CASSOWARIES from ZP).

d. In answer to this proposal, CASSOWARY 2 was told that he was putting the horse before the cart, that if the Ukrainians themselves got together and selected a representation to deal with the U.S., their future relationship with the U.S. Government might prove smoother and produce more results than in the past. Then too, it was pointed out that the Ukrainians should bear in mind that the AMCOMLIB was and is a privately sponsored organization and that the U.S. Government cannot overtly support any emigre groups in their struggle against the existing Soviet regime.

e. In conclusion of this discussion, which took up quite sometime and which is reported here sans minor details, the case officers politely suggested to CASSOWARY 2 that he take the initiative in uniting the Ukrainian groups, if not politically, at least on a common platform of a struggle against Bolshevism which would do him and the Ukrainian emigre groups more good than their present approach. In other words, instead of constantly criticizing the lack of American support, to set their own house in order first. Oddly enough, CASSOWARY 2 agreed with the arguments presented by Natirbov and the case officers.

f. As a sidelight to the above political discussions, CASSOWARY 2 produced a letter written by a recent Ukrainian escapee (John ~~BARD~~) in which the writer tells of his reception by the Americans in Germany. Briefly, his story is as follows. Once in American hands, he was impressed with the material aid given him, however, mentally, he became very depressed when the only language spoken to him by the American representatives was Russian. He began to think that perhaps this was all a dream; that he did not find the sanctuary he was seeking. When confronted by VOA representatives, BARD asked to speak to someone in Ukrainian. The VOA people said that they knew of none who could speak in Ukrainian. When BARD asked for reading material he was given only Russian literature since his caretakers told him that nothing, including newspapers, was available in the Ukrainian languages.

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All this, of course, had an adverse affect on BARD. Later, when he was released, he showed up at the Suchasna Ukraina Office in Munich where he met an old friend to whom he gave the above mentioned letter.

g. The purpose for bringing up this matter was, of course, according to CASSOWARY 2, to show the Great Russian influence in the VOA setup, and the lack of proper handling of Ukrainian defectors and escapees, which, if managed or exploited to the fullest could provide at least some assets in the psychological warfare directed against the Soviet Union, and specifically, in inducing future defection from the Ukraine. [ ] assured CASSOWARY 2 that he would look into the matter further.

9. Other:

a. To keep CASSOWARY 2 informed on the latest W/T traffic, he was shown the most recent exchange of messages to which he made no comments. In this respect, CASSOWARY 2 was brought up-to-date on the latest developments in the exfiltration of the two CAWNPORE couriers as contained in those messages to and from the field.

10. Having concluded to everyone's satisfaction all business requiring discussion, the meetings were brought to a close. A definite date for a future meeting with CASSOWARY 2 was not scheduled in view of the scope of the topics covered here. It was agreed that in the meantime CASSOWARY 15 would keep ~~CASSOWARY 15 would keep~~ CASSOWARY 2 informed on developments in the project as required his attention.

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